gies for the different players.
The standard approach to finding such strategies in games with imperfect information is, in general, computationally intractable.
The approach is to generate the normal form of the game (the matrix containing the payoff for each strategy combination), and then solve a linear program (LP) or a linear complementarily problem (LCP). The size of the normal form, however, is typically exponential in the size of the game tree, thus making this method impractical in all but the simplest cases. This paper describes a new representation of strategies which results in a practical linear formulation of the problem of two-player games with perfect recall (i.e., games where players never forget anything, which is a standard assumption). Standard LP or LCP solvers can then be applied to find optimal randomized strategies, The resulting algorithms are, in generaJ, exponentially better than the standard ones, both in terms of time and in terms of space.
Introduction
Game theory models and analyzes situations involving conflict and cooperation among independent decision makers. It haa played a substantial role in economics [1] , and has been applied to biology [19] , safeguards systems [2] and in the military [18] , among other areas.
In computer science, the idea of modeling interactive situations as games is becoming more common.
The classic paper of Chandra, Kozen and Stockmeyer
[5] characterized the class PSPACE in terms of twoplayer games. The later work on interactive proof systems [34, 7] is also best understood in those terms. Reif [31] If an interactive situation is described es a game, a formal analysis should find optimal (or payoff mmcimizing) strategies for the players, and determine the expected outcome of the game. This analysis must take into account that the payoff for a player's strategy depends on the strategies of the other players. This is inherent in game-theoretic reaaoning.
A solution to a game is a certain combination of strategies, possibly randomized, one for each player. This combination is a Nash equilibm"um if it is self-enforcing-no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from it (see Section 3). The Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept of noncooperative game theory. It reflects the modern paradigm that all players act individually, and cooperative acts (such as signing a contract) are explicitly modeled and must be rational for each player. As shown by Nash [30] , every game has an equilibrium, possibly requiring the use of randomized strategies. The algorithmic problem is to find one.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of solving two-person games represented as game trees. We present algorithms both for zero-sum games and general games, (A game is zero-sum if the sum of the payoffs to the two players is always zero, so their interests are in conflict.) Our algorithms are, in general, exponentially better than the standard approach to the problem. They thus provide the first practical method for solving games that are not toy problems nor have a special structure.
The complexity of solving a game depends highly on the form in which the game is represented, A game may be described by its rules, by a tree or by payoff matrices. The conversion from a tree to a matrix may increase the size exponentially. The increase in size when a tree is generated from rules may not even be bounded. Thus it is not surprising that games are typically hard to solve when represented using their rules. For example, it is PSPACEhard to find optimal strategies for generalized Go [27] and a variety of other games [33, 11] , and EXPTIME-complete to find optimal strategies for generalized Chess [12] They also showed that, in games with imperfect recall, the problem of solving such games is NP-hard.
In this paper, we present a method that avoids the exponential blowup of the normal-form transformation. The basic idea is that the outcome of the game depends only on the distribution of probability weights that a randomized strategy induces on the leaves of the tree.
We represent a strategy compactly in terms of The optimal strategies of a two-player zero-sum perfect-recall game in eztensive form are the solutions of a linear progmm whose size, in sparse TSpnwentation, is linear in the size of the game tree.
The Nash equilibria of a geneml twoplayer perfect-mall game in eztensive form are the solutions of a linear complementarily problem whose size, in sparse representation, is linear in the size of the game tree. The problem of finding an equilibrium can be solved by Lemke 's algorithm.
We therefore obtain an efficient polynomial-time algorithm in the zero-sum case, and an often efficient exponential-time algorithm in the general case. In both cases, the complexity is measured in terms of the size of the game tree. Our algorithms are therefore exponentially better than the standard ones both in terms of time and in terms of space.
Extensive-Form Games
This section recalls the standard definition of a game in eztensive form [23] . The basic structure of the game is a finite directed tree whose nodes denote game states. A play of the game starts at the root, proceeds according to the players' actions, and ends at a leaf. Extensiveform games can have any finite number of players, but we will concentrate on the two-player case. We will use the pronouns "she" for the first player and "he" for the second one. The internal nodes of the tree are of three types: decision nodes of player 1, decision nodes of player 2, and nodes for chance moves. The outgoing edges at a decision node represent possible actions at that node, and have distinct labels called choices. A play denotes the path from the root to some leaf. A move is a choice taken on that path. The payoff function h determines a payoff vector h(a) E R2 for each leaf a. The kth component h~(a) of h(a) is the payoff at a to player k. The relation between the payoffs to the two players is, in general, arbitrary. Thus, the interests of the players may coincide in some circumstances, and conflict in others. A zero-sum game models a situation where the interests of the players are strictly opposed in the sense that h2 = -hl; such a game is shown in Fig. 1 . In the zero-sum case, the payoffs to the first player suffice to describe the game.
In order to represent situations where players may not know everything that occurs in the game (for example, in the game of poker one player's hand is not known to other players), the set of decision nodes is partitioned into information sets. Each information set u belongs to exactly one player k. Intuitively, the player cannot differentiate between different nodes in the same information set. This implies that at each node a in u, the player must have the same set Cti of choices (labels for the outgoing edges) at u. For simplicity, it is aasumed that the choice sets C'u and C'ut of any two information sets u and u' are disjoint. The set of all information sets of player k is denoted by Uk. The set uu~~b C'u of all choices of player k is denoted by Dk. We make the standard assumption that an information set is not visited more than once during one play. Fhmlly, the be havior at the chance nodes is specified by a function B which defines a probability distribution over the possible choices at each chance node.
The players plan their actions according to strategies. The basic strategy in an extensive-form game is a pure (or deterministic) strategy.
A pure strategy Tk of player k specifies a choice at each information set u E Uk. (Note that since the player knows only which information set he or she is at, a strategy must dictate the same move at all nodes in an information set.) Let
Pk denote the set of player k's pure strategies. Clearly, this set is the cartesian product~U~uk Cu. A mized stmtegy pk of player k is a probability distribution on the set Pk of his or her pure strategies.
We can define the expected payoff H(u) for each pair of mixed strategies p = (PI, p2). A strategy pair V, together with~, induces a probability distribution on the leaves of the tree. We denote the probability for reaching a leaf a by PrP(a). The expected payoff If(p) is then defined to be equilibn"um: having been given the solution, no player should be able to gain by unilaterally deviating from it.
Technically, a strategy pair (pl, p2) is an equilibrium if pi is a best response to p2 and p2 is a best response to PI, where a strategy pl is a best response to the strategy pz of player 2 if it yields the maximum possible payoff HI (Al, p2) to player 1 against jL2 (a best response of player 2 is defined analogously). Nash [30] proved that every game haa such an equilibrium.
For zero-sum games, the equilibrium is a particularly strong solution concept. There, it is equivalent to a pair of max-min strategies, where each player optimizes his or her worst-caae expected payoff. A max-min strategy for. player 1 is a strategy P1 that maximizes min~z HI (P1, p2 ). A max-min strategy for player 2 is defined similarly. Hence, in a zero-sum game, the best worst caae payoff is also the best payoff that a player can expect against a rational opponent. Furthermore, a player can choose to play his or her max-min strategy independently of the actions of the other player. In generaJ two-player games, equilibrium strategies do not have these properties.
The standard method for solving any extensive-form game calls for constructing the normal jorm (also known aa strategic form).
In this form, all possible pure strategy pairs of the players are tabulated, along with the expected payoff for each player when such a strategy pair In zero-sum games, B = -A, so the normal form of the game is completely specified by A. Figure 2 shows such a matrix game. The normal form representation loses all of the structure encoded in a game tree. On the other hand, games in this form are quite simple to solve. The methods are well known. The following exposition, however, will allow us to apply the same principles to a much smaller strategic represention, described in Section 5 below.
Consider a mixed strategy pl and recall that, by definition, it is a probability distribution on P1. We can represent pl as a vector z with m components representing the probabilities PI (ml) aasigned by pl to the pure strategies # in P1. In fact, any nonnegative mvector z = (21, ..., Zm)T with~~1 z~= 1 describes a mixed strategy.
Similarly, a mixed strategy p2 can be represented by an n-vector~. It is easy to see that the expected payoff H1 (#1, M2) is equal to the matrix product d'dyj and similarly H2(p1, p2) = ZTBV.
In and right-hand side e. Similarly, v represents a mixed strategy p2 of player 2 iff y~O and FM =~, where the F is a 1 x n matrix of 1's and the right-hand side~is the scalar 1. Again,~and~will later be generalized.
We consider the problem of finding a best response v to player 1's strategy a. This is a linear program:
g~o.
In the dual problem of (2) 
Any pair V, q of feasible solutions of the primaJ (2) and its dual (3) obviously satisfies qTf = qTF9 > (zTB)~. This is known aa the weak duality theorem, stating that feasible primal and dual objective function values comprise mutual bounds. By the strong duaMy theorem [10] , they are equal at optimaMy; that is, V, q is an optimal pair if qTf = qTFg = xTB~.
Analogously, a best response x to the strategy g of player 2 is a solution to the following problem:
x~o.
The dual problem (6) uses the unconstrained vector p, in the present case again just a scalar: minimize eTp P subject to ETp > Ay. (6) Again, a prdr s,p of feasible solutions to (5) and (6) satisfies eTp 2 aCTAgI, and is optimal iff eTp = xTETp = xTA~. (7) Note that in both csses, the primal and dual programs have the same value. In the caae of (5) and (6) this is the best payoff player 1 can achieve if player 2 plays v.
In order to find an equilibrium, we need to find z and g such that each is a best response to the other. For a zero-sum game, this can be computed with the following LP which is essentially (6) but with variables p and V:
The intuition used in deriving this LP is az follows.
Since the game is zero-sum, the optimal value eTp of (6) is the payoff that player 2, if he plays V, has to give to player 1. The system (8) reflects player 2's wish to minimize this payoff. Hence, the result of (8) is a maxmin strategy for hlm and thus part of an equilibrium because the game is zero-sum. The dual of (8) In a zero-sum game, -A = B, so (9) is just (3) but with variables q and z. Optimal solutions (y, p) and (z, q) to (8) and (9) fulfill eTp = -qTf by strong duaMy.
Since eTp > XTAgJ = -zTB#~-qTf, (7) and (4) must hold, so that these solutions are also optimal for (2), (3), (5), and (6).
An equilibrium of the zero-sum game, that is, a pair of optimal solutions to (8) and (9), is simultaneously computed by the simplex algorithm [10] . The problem can of course be solved in polynomial time (in the size of the matrix) by any polynomial linear programming algorithm.
In the czse of a non-zero-sum game, the problem of finding equilibrium strategies for the players defines the following problem: find z >0, y~O, p, q so that -AU + ETp 
The orthogonality conditions (11) are equivalent to (7) and (4), and are known as complementary slackness conditions in linear programming.
The system (10) and (11) is a linear complementarily problem (LCP) [8] . 
Realization Weights
Mixed strategies assign a probability to each of the exponentially many pure strategies. It turns out that some of this information is redundant. Intuitively, the effect of a mixed strategy pk in a game is determined by its behavior at the leaves of the game tree. However, a strategy pk for a single player does not define a probs bility distribution on the leaves: the probability PrP(a) also depends on the other player's strategy. We therefore need an alternative notion: realization weights.
Let k be a player, k = 1,2, and let a be a node of the game tree. There is a unique path from the root to a. On this path, certain edges correspond to moves of player k. The string of labels of these edges is denoted by ok(a) and is called the sequence of choices of player k leading to a. It may be the empty sequence 0, for example if a is the root.
For the moment, we consider the leaves a. The sequence Uk (a) describes the choices that player k has to make so that a can be reached in the game. A pure strategy Tk can only reach a if it chooses to make every move in Uk (a) at the appropriate information sets. For a mixed strategy Pk, we define the rmlization weight of a under~k, denoted by pk(ak (a)), to be the sum of the probabilities pk (mk ) over all those Tk whose choices match those required by Ok(a). Let~l(a) denote the product of the chance probabilities on the path to a, and consider a pair p = (P1, AZ ) of mixed strategies. When these strategies are used, then a is obviously reached with probability
Now, consider two mixed strategies PI and jil that generate the same realization weights. Then for any strategy p2, the probabilities of reaching the leaves of the tree are the same. Therefore, by (l), the expected payoffs lf(pl, p2) and 17(jll, p2) are also equal. This justifies our intuition that the set {pk(ak (a))}a of realization weights of the leaves a captures all the relevant information about p k. We call such strategies pl and jil equivalent.
(This corresponds to a standard notion of equivalence of strategies [9] .) A set of realization weights therefore describes an equivalence class of mixed strategies.
Using techniques of [22], we can prove that this equivalence class contains a member that can be represented compactly. More precisely, define the support of pk to be the set of pure strategies to which it assigns positive probability. Theorem 4.1 For any strategy pk there ezists an equivalent strategy~k such that the support of 12k contains at most t pure strategies, where t is the number of leaves in the tree. Therefore, although mixed strategies ciften use an exponential number of pure strategies, this is unnecessary.
Mixed strategies need never be "too large": we need at most a linear number of pure strategies in the size of the game tree. There are several benefits to using a mixed strategy whose support is small: (i) we need less space to store it; (ii) it is easier to use while playing the game; (iii) algorithms that use the strategy (for example, in order to compute a best response to it) are more efficient;
(iv) it is easier to reason about and understand the behavior of the strategy in the game. But there is yet another important benefit we can derive from the existence of strategies with small supports. When computing a solution, certain algorithms traverse all possible supports for a potential solution strategy.
In general, the number of possible supports is exponential in the size of normal form, and therefore doubly exponential in the size of the tree. However, we only need to look for strategies over small supports, and the number of small supports is exponential in the size of tree. For example, the complete enumeration algorithm for solving LCP 's, mentioned in Section 3, can be transformed to run in exponential time in the size of the game tree rather than in the size of the normal form. This allows us to prove the following theorem:
All the Nash equilibria of a general twoplayer game in eztensive jorm can be found in exponential time in the size of the game tree.
Currently, this is the only exponentizd-time algorithm for computing equilibria in general two-player games with imperfect recall. Player k is said to have perfect recall if for any information set u E Uk, any two nodes a and b in u define the same sequence for player k, that is, Uk (a) = u~(b). Intuitively, if the player makes different choices on the paths to a and b, and does not forget, then he or she must be able to distinguish between a and b, so these nodes belong to different information sets.
As we mentioned in the introduction, Wilson [38] presented an algorithm for solving general two-player games with perfect recall. We can also use this idea to provide a formal analysis for this algorithm. Wilson's algorithm does not use the entire normal form.
Instead, only pure strategies actually used in a mixed strategy are generated as needed from the game tree.
(The technique for generating pure strategies from the game tree uses backward induction and hence requires the assumption of perfect recall.) Wilson justified thk by the observation "commonly verified in computational experience on practicaJ problems" that "the frequency of equilibria using only a very few of the available pure strategies is very high." Our results show that Wilson's assumption is provably true, rather than being an experimental observation.
We can thus prove that Wilson's algorithm is indeed efficient (exponential in the size of the game tree).
5
Sequences Instead of Strategies
As we showed in the previous section, the concept of realization weights can be used to improve algorithms that use mixed strategies as well as the analysis of such algorithms.
We can go further by computing directly with realization weights instead of mixed strategy probabilities. More precisely, in previous sections we considered algorithms that compute with vectors x, y representing mixed strategies. We now present algorithms that compute with vectors that directly represent realization weights.
For our construction, we consider reahzation weights for sequences in general rather than for sequences associated with nodes. Let Sk be the set of sequences for player k. We introduce a variable so for each a E S1
and a variable YC for each u G S2, and denote the vectors with these components by z and V. Intuitively, a component of c represents pl (a) for some u q S1 in the same way as it represented PI(#) for some # E P1 represented by a small number, namely 1+11111, of variables, characterized by a small number, namely 1+ IU1 [, 1For games with perfect recall, realization weights are closely related to behavior dtutegies. These use local randomization, by describing a probability distribution over the choices at each information set. In games with perfect recall, for every mixed strategy there is an equivalent behavior strategy [23] , so that we could use behavior strategies as a compact representation of a mixed strategy.
However, behavior strategies are not suitable for the purposes of computing equilibria, since the payoff cannot be described as a linear function in the variables defining a behavior strategy.
of linear constraints.
We can therefore define a constraint matrix E and a right-hand-side e such that the weights in x represent some mixed strategy iff EZ = e and x~O hold. The dimensions of E are linear in the size of thetree because E isofsize (l+ IUII)X(l+[DII).
Furthermore, the matrix is sparse since there is one entry 1 for each column and one entry -1 for each row except the first, and all other entries are zero. A similar construction of y, F, and f goes through for player 2.
Such a construction for both players is illustrated in Fig. 3 [8, p, 340] . A similar technique for prevention of cycling given a degenerate problem is known for the simplex algorithm. With degeneracy thus taken care of, Theorem 5.2 is employed using the following two lemmas, where the first is immediate from the structure of the constraint matrices (see Fig. 3 for an example). entries. This can be assumed without loss of generality, by subtracting a constant from the payoffs to the players at the leaves of the tree so that these become nonpositive (this transformation does not change the game). [2]
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